Web applications continue to be a favorite target for hackers due to a combination of wide adoption and rapid deployment cycles, which o en lead to the introduction of high impact vulnerabilities. Static analysis tools are important to search for bugs automatically in the program source code, supporting developers on their removal. However, building these tools requires programming the knowledge on how to discover the vulnerabilities. is paper presents an alternative approach in which tools learn to detect aws automatically by resorting to arti cial intelligence concepts, more concretely to natural language processing. e approach employs a sequence model to learn to characterize vulnerabilities based on an annotated corpus. A erwards, the model is utilized to discover and identify vulnerabilities in the source code. It was implemented in the DEKANT tool and evaluated experimentally with a large set of PHP applications and WordPress plugins. Overall, we found several hundred vulnerabilities belonging to 12 classes of input validation vulnerabilities, where 62 of them were zero-day.
INTRODUCTION
Web applications are being used to implement interfaces of a myriad of services. ey are o en the rst target of a acks, and despite considerable e orts to improve security, there are still many examples of high impact compromises. In the 2017 OWASP Top 10 list, vulnerabilities like SQL injection (SQLI) and cross-site scripting (XSS) continue to raise signi cant concerns, but other classes are also listed as being commonly exploited [39] . Millions of websites have been compromised since Oct. 2014 due to vulnerabilities in plugins of Drupal [4] and WordPress [35, 36] , and the data of more than a billion users has been stolen using SQLI a acks against various kinds of services (governmental, nancial, education, mail, etc) [10, 34] . In addition, the next wave of XSS a acks has been predicted for the past two years, with an important expected growth of the problem [11, 31] .
Many of these vulnerabilities are related to malformed inputs that reach some relevant asset (e.g., the database or the user's browser) by traveling through a code slice (a series of instructions) of the web application. erefore, a good practice to enhance security is to pass inputs through sanitization functions that invalidate dangerous metacharacters or/and validation functions that check their content. In addition, programmers commonly use static analysis tools to search automatically for bugs in the source code, facilitating their removal. e development of these tools, however, requires coding explicitly the knowledge on how each vulnerability can be detected [6, 9, 12, 17] , which is a complex task. Moreover, this knowledge might be incomplete or partially wrong, making the tools inaccurate [7] . For example, if the tools do not understand that a certain function sanitizes inputs, they could raise an alert about a vulnerability that does not exist.
is paper presents a new approach for static analysis that is based on learning to recognize vulnerabilities. It leverages from arti cial intelligence (AI) concepts, more precisely from classi cation models for sequences of observations that are commonly used in the eld of natural language processing (NLP). NLP is a con uence of AI and linguistics, which involves intelligent analysis of wri en language, i.e., the natural languages. In this sense, NLP is considered a sub-area of AI. It can be viewed as a new form of intelligence in an arti cial way that can get insights how humans understand natural languages. NLP tasks, such as parts-of-speech (PoS) tagging or named entity recognition (NER), are typically modelled as sequence classi cation problems, in which a class (e.g., a given morpho-syntactic category) is assigned to each word in a given sentence, according to estimate given by a structured prediction model that takes word order into consideration. e model's parameters are normally inferred using supervised machine learning techniques, taking advantage of annotated corpora.
We propose applying a similar approach to web programming languages, i.e., to analyse source code in a similar manner to what is being done with natural language text. Even though, these languages are arti cial, they have many characteristics in common with natural languages, such as words, syntactic rules, sentences, and a grammar. NLP usually employs machine learning to extract rules (knowledge) automatically from a corpus. en, with this knowledge, other sequences of observations can be processed and classi ed. NLP has to take into account the order of the observations, as the meaning of sentences depends on it. erefore NLP involves forms of classication more sophisticated than approaches based on standard classi ers (e.g., naive Bayes, decision trees, support vector machines), which simply check the presence of certain observations without considering any relation between them.
Our approach for static analysis resorts to machine language techniques that take the order of source code instructions into account -sequence models -to allow accurate detection and identi cation of the vulnerabilities in the code. Previous applications of machine learning in the context of static analysis neither produced tools that learn to make detection nor employed sequence models. For example, PhpMinerII resorts to machine learning to train standard classi ers, which then verify if certain constructs (associated with aws) exist in the code. However, it does not provide the exact location of the vulnerabilities [28, 29] . WAP and WAPe use a taint analyser to search for vulnerabilities and a standard classi er to con rm that the found bugs 1 can actually create security problems [17] . None of these tools considers the order of code elements or the relation among them, leading to bugs being missed (false negatives, FN ) and alarms being raised on correct code (false positives, FP).
Our sequence model is a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [23] . A HMM is a Bayesian network composed of nodes corresponding to the states and edges associated to the probabilities of transitioning between states. States are hidden, i.e., are not observed. Given a sequence of observations, the hidden states (one per observation) are discovered following the model and taking into account the order of the observations. erefore, the HMM can be used to nd the series of states that best explains the sequence of observations. e paper also presents the hidDEn marKov model diAgNosing vulnerabiliTies (DEKANT) tool that implements our approach for applications wri en in PHP. e tool was evaluated experimentally with a diverse set of 23 open source web applications with bugs disclosed in the past. ese applications are substantial, with an aggregated size of around 8,000 les and 2.5 million lines of code (LoC). All aws that we are aware of being previously reported were found by DEKANT. More than one thousand slices were analyzed, 714 were classi ed as having vulnerabilities and 305 as not. e false positives were in the order of two dozens. In addition, the tool checked 23 plugins of WordPress and found 62 zero-day vulnerabilities. ese aws were reported to the developers, and some of them already con rmed their existence and xed the plugins. DEKANT was also assessed with several other vulnerability detection tools, and the results give evidence that our approach leads to be er accuracy and precision.
e main contributions of the paper are: (1) a novel approach for improving the security of web applications by le ing static analysis tools learn to discover vulnerabilities through an annotated corpus; (2) an intermediate language representation capturing the relevant features of PHP, and a sequence model that takes into consideration the place where code elements appear in the slices and how they alter the spreading of the input data; (3) a static analysis tool that implements the approach; (4) an experimental evaluation that demonstrates the ability of this tool to nd known and zero-day vulnerabilities with a residual number of mistakes.
RELATED WORK
Static analysis tools search for vulnerabilities in the applications usually by processing the source code (e.g., [2, 6, 9, 12, 17, 27, 33] ). Many of these tools perform taint analysis, tracking user inputs to determine if they reach a sensitive sink (i.e., a function that could be exploited). Pixy [12] was one of the rst tools to automate this kind of analysis on PHP applications. Later on, RIPS [6] extended this technique with the ability to process more advanced constructs of PHP (e.g., objects). phpSAFE [9] is a recent solution that does taint analysis to look for aws in CMS plugins (e.g., WordPress plugins). WAP [17, 18] also does taint analysis, but aims at reducing the number of false positives by resorting to data mining, besides also correcting automatically the located bugs. Other works [42, 43] detect vulnerabilities by processing source code properties represented as graphs. In this paper, we propose an novel approach which, unlike these works, does not involve programming information about bugs, but instead extracts this knowledge from annotated code samples and thus learns to nd the vulnerabilities.
Machine learning has been used in a few works to measure the quality of so ware by collecting a series of a ributes that reveal the presence of so ware defects [1, 14] . Other approaches resort to machine learning to predict if there are vulnerabilities in a program [19, 22, 38] , which is di erent from identifying precisely the bugs, something that we do in this paper. To support the predictions they employ various features, such as past vulnerabilities and function calls [19] , or a combination of code-metric analysis with metadata gathered from application repositories [22] . In particular, PhpMinerI and PhpMinerII predict the presence of vulnerabilities in PHP programs [28] [29] [30] . e tools are rst trained with a set of annotated slices that end at a sensitive sink (but do not necessarily start at an entry point), and then they are ready to identify slices with errors. WAP and WAPe are di erent because they use machine learning and data mining to predict if a vulnerability detected by taint analysis is actually a real bug or a false alarm [17, 18] . In any case, PhpMiner and WAP tools employ standard classi ers (e.g., Logistic Regression or a Multi-Layer Perceptron) instead of structured prediction models (i.e., a sequence classi er) as we propose here.
ere are a few static analysis tools that implement machine learning techniques. Chucky [44] discovers vulnerabilities by identifying missing checks in C language so ware. VulDeePecker [15] resorts to code gadgets to represent parts of C programs and then transforms them into vectors. A neural network system then determines if the target program is vulnerable due to bu er or resource management errors. Russell et al. [25] developed a vulnerability detection tool for C and C++ based on features learning from a dataset and arti cial neural network. Scandariato et al. [26] performs text mining to predict vulnerable so ware components in Android applications. SuSi [24] employs machine learning to classify sources and sinks in the code of Android API. is paper extends our previous work [16] . Our approach extracts PHP slices, but contrary to the others it translates them into a tokenized language to be processed by a HMM. While tools in the literature collect a ributes from a slice and classify them without considering ordering relations among statements, which is simplistic, DEKANT also does classi cation but takes into account the place in which code elements appear in the slice. Such form of classi cation assists on a more accurate and precise detection of bugs.
SURFACE VULNERABILITIES
Many classes of security aws in web applications are caused by improper handling of user inputs. erefore, they are denominated surface vulnerabilities or input validation vulnerabilities. In PHP programs the malicious input arrives to the application (e.g, $ POST ), then it may su er various modi cations and might be copied to variables, and eventually reaches a security-sensitive function (e.g., mysqli query or echo) inducing an erroneous action. Below, we introduce the 12 classes of surface vulnerabilities that will be considered in rest of the paper.
SQLI is the class of vulnerabilities with highest risk in the OWASP Top 10 list [39] . Normally, the malicious input is used to change the behavior of a query to a database to provoke the disclosure of private data or corrupt the tables. e PHP script of Fig. 1 (a) has a simple SQLI vulnerability. $u receives the username provided by the user (line 1), and then it is inserted in a query (lines 2-3). An a acker can inject a malicious username like ' OR 1 = 1 --, modifying the structure of the query and ge ing the passwords of all users.
XSS vulnerabilities allow a ackers to execute scripts in the users' browsers. Below we give an example:
e code snippet of Fig. 2 (a) has a XSS vulnerability. If the user provides a name, it gets saved in $u (line 1). en, if conditional validation is false (line 3), the value is returned to the user by echo (line 6). A script provided as input would be executed in the browser, possibly carrying out some malicious deed. e other classes are presented brie y. Remote and local le inclusion (RFI/LFI) aws also allow a ackers to insert code in the vulnerable web application. While in RFI the code can be located in another web site, in LFI it has to be in the local le system (but there are also several strategies to put it there). OS command injection (OSCI) lets an a acker to provide commands to be run in a shell of the OS of the web server. A ackers can supply code that is executed by a eval function by exploring PHP command injection (PHPCI) bugs. LDAP injection (LDAPI), like SQLI, is associated to the construction and execution of queries, in this case for the LDAP service. An a acker can read les from the local le system by exploiting directory traversal / path traversal (DT/PT) and source code disclosure (SCD) vulnerabilities. A comment spamming (CS) bug is related to the ranking manipulation of spammers' web sites. Header injection or HTTP response spli ing (HI) allows an a acker to manipulate the HTTP response. An a acker can force a web client to use a session ID he de ned by exploiting a session xation (SF) aw.
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OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
Our approach for vulnerability detection examines program slices to determine if they contain a bug. e slices are collected from the source code of the target application, and then their instructions are represented in an intermediate language developed to express features that are relevant to surface vulnerabilities. Bugs are found by classifying the translated instructions with an HMM sequence model. Since the model has an understanding of how the data ows are a ected by operations related to sanitization, validation and modi cation, it becomes feasible to make an accurate analysis. In order to setup the model, there is a learning phase where an annotated corpus is employed to derive the knowledge about the di erent classes of vulnerabilities. A erwards, the model is used to detect vulnerabilities. Fig. 3 illustrates this procedure.
In more detail, the following steps are carried out. e learning phase is composed mainly of steps (1)-(3) while the detection phase encompasses (1) and (4):
(1) Slice collection and translation: get the slices from the application source code (either for learning or detection). Since we are focusing on surface vulnerabilities, the only slices that have to be considered need to start at some point in the program where an user input is received (i.e., at an entry point) and then they have to end at a security-sensitive instruction (i.e., a sensitive sink). e resulting slice is a series of tracked instructions between the two points. en, each instruction of a slice is represented into the Intermediate Slice Language (ISL) (Section 5). ISL is a categorized language with grammar rules that aggregate in classes the code elements by functionality. A slice in the ISL format is going to be named as slice-isl;
(2) Create the corpus: build a corpus with a group of instructions represented in the intermediate language, which are labeled either as vulnerable or non-vulnerable. e instructions are provided individually or gathered from slices of training programs. Overall, the corpus includes both representative pieces of programs that have various kinds of aws and that handle inputs adequately;
(3) Knowledge extraction: acquire knowledge from the corpus to con gure the HMM sequence model, namely compute the probability matrices;
(4) Search for Vulnerabilities: use the model to nd the best sequence of states that explains a slice in the intermediate language. Each instruction in the slice corresponds to a sequence of observations. ese observations are classi ed by the model, tracking the variables from the previous instructions to nd out which emission probabilities are selected. e state computed for the last observation of the last instruction determines the overall classi cation, either as vulnerable or not. If a aw is found, an alert is reported including the location in the source code. e next two sections explain the ISL language and the sequence model (Section 5 and 6). en, the four above steps are elaborated in Section 7. An overview of the tool that implements our approach is given in Section 8.
INTERMEDIATE SLICE LANGUAGE
All slices commence with an entry point and nish with a sensitive sink; between them there can be an arbitrary number of statements, such as assignments that transmit data to intermediate variables and various kinds of expressions that validate or modify the data. In other words, a slice contains all instructions (lines of code) that manipulate and propagate an input arriving at an entry point and until a sensitive sink is reached, but no other statements.
ISL expresses an instruction into a few tokens. e instructions are composed of code elements that are categorized in classes of related items (e.g., class input takes PHP entry points like $ GET and $ POST). erefore, classes are the tokens of the ISL language and these are organized together accordingly to a grammar. Next we give a more careful explanation of ISL assuming that the source code is programmed in the PHP language. However, the approach is generic and other languages could be considered.
Tokens
ISL abstracts away aspects of the PHP language that are irrelevant to the discovery of surface vulnerabilities. erefore, as a starting point to specify ISL, it was necessary to identify the essential tokens. To achieve this, we followed an iterative approach where we began with an initial group of tokens which were gradually re ned. In every iteration, we examined various slices (vulnerable and not) to recognize the important code elements. We also looked at the PHP instructions that could manipulate entry points and be associated to bugs or prevent them (e.g., functions that replace characters in strings). In addition, for PHP functions, we studied cautiously their parameters to determine which of them are crucial for our analysis. In the end, we de ned around twenty tokens that are su cient to describe the instructions of a PHP program.
Example 5.1. Function mysqli query and its parameters correspond to two tokens: ss for sensitive sink; and var for variable or input if the parameter receives data originating from an entry point. Although this function has three parameters (the last of them optional), notice that just one of them (the second) is essential to represent. Table 1 summarizes the currently de ned ISL tokens. e rst column shows above the twenty tokens that stand for PHP code elements whereas the last two tokens are necessary only for the A more cautious inspection of the tokens shows that they enable many relevant behaviors to be expressed. For example: Since the manipulation of strings plays a fundamental role in the exploitation of surface vulnerabilities, there are various tokens that enable a precise modeling of these operations (e.g., erase str or sub str); Tokens char5 and char6 act as the amount of characters that are manipulated by functions that extract or replace the contents from a user input; e place in a string where modi cations are applied (begin, middle or end) is described by start where; Token cond can correspond to an if statement that might have validation functions over variables (e.g., user inputs) as part of its conditional expression. is token allows the correlation among the validated variables and the variables that appear inside the if branches.
ere are a few tokens that are context-sensitive, i.e., whose selection depends not only on the code elements being translated but also on how they are utilized in the program. Tokens char5 and char6 are two examples as they depend on the substring length. If this length is only de ned at runtime, it is impossible to know precisely which token should be assigned. is ambiguity may originate errors in the analysis, either leading to false positives or false negatives. However, since we prefer to be conservative (i.e., report false positives instead of missing vulnerabilities), in the situation where the length is unde ned, ISL uses the char6 token because it allows larger payloads to be manipulated. Something similar occurs with the contentchk token that depends on the veri cation pa ern.
ISL must be able to represent PHP instructions in all steps of the two phases of the approach. When slices are extracted for analysis, ISL sets all variables to the default token value var. However, when instructions are placed in the corpus or are processed by the detection procedure, it is necessary to keep information about taintedness. In this case, tainted and untainted variables are depicted respectively by the tokens var vv and var. e miss token is also used with the corpus and it serves to normalize the length of sequences (Section 8).
Grammar
e ISL grammar is speci ed by the rules in Listing 1. It allows the representation of the code elements included in the instructions into the tokens (Table 1 , column 3 entries are transformed into the column 1 tokens). A slice translated into ISL consists of a set of statements (line 2), each one de ned by either: a rule that covers various operations like string concatenation (lines 4-11); or an conditional (line 12); or an assignment (line 13). e rules take into consideration the syntax of the functions (in column 3 of the table) in order to convey: a sensitive sink (line 4), the sanitization (line 5), the validation (line 6), the extraction and modi cation (lines 7-10), and the concatenation (line 11). As we will see in Section 6, tokens will correspond to the observations of the HMM. However, while a PHP assignment sets the value of the right-hand-side expression to the le -hand side, the tokens will be processed from le to right by the model; therefore, the assignment rule in ISL follows the HMM scheme.
Example 5.2. PHP instruction $u = $ GET['user']; is translated to input var. e assignment and parameter rules (lines 13, 22 and 23) derive the input token, while the a ribution rule produces the var token (line 24).
THE SEQUENCE MODEL
is section presents the sequence model that supports vulnerability detection. It explains the graph that represents the model, identifying the states and the observations that can be emi ed.
Hidden Markov Model
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical generative model that represents a process as a Markov chain with unobserved (hidden) states. It is a dynamic Bayesian network with nodes that stand for random variables and edges that denote probabilistic dependencies between these variables [3, 13, 32] . e variables are divided in two groups: observed variables -observationsand hidden variables -states. A state transitions to other states with some probability and emits observations (see example in Fig. 5) .
A HMM is speci ed by the following: (1) a vocabulary, a set of words, symbols or tokens that make up the sequence of observations; (2) the states, a group of states that classify the observations of a sequence; (3) parameters, a set of probabilities where (i) the initial probabilities indicate the probability of a sequence of observations begins at each start-state; (ii) the transition probabilities between states; and (iii) the emission probabilities, which specify the probability of a state emi ing a given observation.
In the context of NLP, sequence models are used to classify a series of observations, which correspond to the succession of words observed in a sentence. In particular, a HMM is used in PoS tagging tasks, allowing the discovery of a series of states that best explains a new sequence of observations. is is known as the decoding problem, which can be solved by the Viterbi algorithm [37] .
is algorithm resorts to dynamic programming to pick the best hidden state sequence. Although the Viterbi algorithm employs bigrams to generate the i-th state, it takes into account all previously generated states, but this is not directly visible. In a nutshell, the algorithm iteratively obtains the probability distribution for the i-th state based on the probabilities computed for the (i-1)-th state, taking into consideration the parameters of the model. e parameters of the HMM are learned by processing a corpus that is created for training. Observations and state transitions are counted, and a erwards the counts are normalized in order to obtain probability distributions; a smoothing procedure may also be applied to deal with rare events in the training data (e.g., add-one smoothing).
Vocabulary and States
As our HMM operates over the program instructions translated into ISL, the vocabulary is composed of the previously described ISL tokens. e states are selected to represent the fundamental operations that can be performed on the input data as it ows through a slice. Five states were de ned as displayed Table 2 . e nal state of an instruction in ISL is either vulnerable (Taint) Validation contentchk, llchk, input, typechk num, typechk str, var, var vv Chg str Change string add str, char5, char6, erase str, input, join str, replace str, split str, start where, sub str, sub str replace, var, var vv or not-vulnerable (N-Taint). However, in order to a ain an accurate detection, it is necessary to take into account the sanitization (San), validation (Val) and modi cation (Chg str) of the user inputs and the variables that may depend on them. erefore, these three factors are represented as intermediate states in the model. As strings are on the base of web surface vulnerabilities, these three states allow the model to determine the intermediate state when an application manipulates them.
Graph of the Model
Our HMM consists of the graph in Fig. 4 , where the nodes constitute the states and the edges the transitions between them. e dashed squares next to the nodes hold the observations that can be emi ed in each state. An ISL instruction corresponds to a sequence of observations. e sequence can start in any state except Val. However, it can reach the Val state for example due to conditionals that check the input data. In the example of Fig. 2 (b), in line 3, one notices a sequence that initiates with a cond observation that could be emi ed by the N-Taint initial state. en, it would transit to the Val state due to the check that is carried out in the if conditional. When the processing of the sequence completes, the model is always either in the Taint or N-Taint states. erefore, the nal state determines the overall classi cation of the statement, i.e., if the instruction is vulnerable or not. Example 6.1. Fig. 5 shows an instantiation of the model for one sequence. e sanitization instruction is translated to the ISL sequence sanit f input var. e sequence starts in the San state and emits the sanit f observation; next it remains in the same state and emits the input observation; then, it transits to N-Taint state, emi ing the var observation (untainted variable).
(a) PHP instruction: $p = mysqli real escape string($con, $ GET['user'])
ISL instruction: sanit f input var Sequence: sanit f,San input,San var,N-Taint 
LEARNING AND VULNERABILITY DETECTION
is section explains the main activities related with our approach. e learning phase encompasses a number of activities that culminate with the computation of the parameters of the HMM model. Following that, the vulnerabilities are found by processing the slices of the target application through model in the detection phase. Fig. 3 illustrates the fundamental steps.
Slice Extraction and Translation Process
e slice extractor analyses les with the source code, gathering the slices that start with an entry point and eventually reach some security-sensitive sink. e instructions between these points are those that implement the application logic based on the user input data. e slice extractor performs intra-and inter-procedural analysis, as it tracks the inputs and its dependencies along the program, walking through the invoked functions. e analysis is context-sensitive as it takes into account the results of function calls.
A translation process occurs when the instructions are collected and consists in representing them as ISL tokens. However, ISL does not maintain much information about the variables portrayed by the var token. is knowledge is nevertheless crucial for a more accurate vulnerability detection as variables are related to the inputs in distinct manners and their contents can su er all sorts of modi cations. erefore, to address this issue, we update a data structure called variable map while the slice is translated. e map associates each occurrence of var in the slice-isl with the name of the variable that appears in the source code. is lets us track how input data propagates to di erent variables when the slice code elements are processed.
ere is an entry in the variable map per instruction. Each entry starts with a ag, 1 or 0, indicating if the statement is an assignment or not. e rest of the entry includes one value per token of the instruction, which is either the name of the variable (without the $) or thecharacter (stands for a token that is not occupied by a variable). Example 7.1. Fig. 1 (a) displays a PHP code snippet that is vulnerable to SQLI and Fig. 1(b) shows the translation into ISL and the variable map (ignore the right-hand side for now). e rst line is the assignment of an input to a variable, $u = $ POST['username'];. As explained above, it becomes input var in ISL. e variable map entry 1 -u is initialized to 1 to denote that the instruction is an assignment to the var in the second position. e next line is an assignment of a SQL query composed by concatenating constant substrings with a variable. It is represented in ISL by var var and in the variable map by 1 u q. e last line corresponds to a sensitive sink (ss) and two variables.
Example 7.2. Fig. 2 has a slightly more complex code snippet. e slice extractor takes from the code two slices: lines {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 3, 5, 6}. e rst prevents an a ack with a form of input validation, but the second is vulnerable to XSS. e corresponding ISL and variable map are shown in the middle columns. e interesting cases are in lines 3 and 4, which are the if statement and its true branch. Both are pre xed with the cond token and the former also ends with the same token.
is cond termination makes a distinction between the two types of instructions. In addition, the sequence model will understand that variables from the former may in uence those that appear in la er instructions.
Process of Creating the Corpus
e corpus plays an important role as it incorporates the knowledge that will be learned by the model, namely which instructions may lead to a aw. In our case, the corpus is a group of instructions (not slices) converted to ISL, where tokens are tagged with information related to taint propagation. e model sees the tokens of an instruction in ISL as a sequence of observations. e tags correspond to the states of the model. erefore, an alternative way to look at the corpus is as a group of sequences of observations annotated with states. e corpus is built in four steps: (1) collection of a group of instructions that are vulnerable and not-vulnerable, which are placed in a bag; (2) representation of each instruction in the bag in ISL;
(3) annotation of the tokens of every instruction (e.g., as tainted or sanitized), i.e., associate a state to each observation of the sequence; and (4) removal of duplicated entries in the bag. In the end, an instruction becomes a list of pairs of token,state .
In the rst step, it is necessary to get representative instructions of all classes of bugs that one wants to catch, various forms of validations, diverse forms of manipulating (changing) strings, and di erent combinations of code elements. To achieve this in practice, we can gather individual instructions or/and we can select a large number of slices captured from open source training applications. erefore, both the collection and representation can be performed in an automatic manner (with the slice collector module), but the annotation of the tokens is done manually (as in all supervised machine learning approaches). Example 7.3. Instruction $var = $ POST['paramater'] becomes input var in ISL, and is annotated as input,Taint var vv,Taint . Both states are Taint (compromised) because the input can be the source of malicious data, and therefore is always Taint, and then the taint propagates to the variable.
As mentioned in the previous section, the token var vv is not produced when slices are translated into ISL, but used in the corpus to represent variables with state Taint (tainted variables). In fact, during translation into ISL variables are not known to be tainted or not, so they are represented by the var token. In the corpus, if the state of the variable is annotated as Taint, the variable is portrayed by var vv, forming the pair var vv,Taint . e state of the last observation of a sequence corresponds to a nal state, and therefore it can only be Taint (vulnerable) or N-Taint (not-vulnerable). If this state is tainted then it means that a malicious input is able to propagate and potentially compromise the execution. erefore, in this case, the instruction is perceived as vulnerable. Otherwise, the instruction is deemed correct (non-vulnerable).
is translated to sanit f input var and placed in the corpus as the succession of pairs sanit f,San input,San var,N-Taint . e rst two tokens are annotated with the San state because function htlmentities sanitizes its parameter; the last token is labeled with the N-Taint state, meaning that the ultimate state of the sequence is not tainted. Example 7.5. Listing 2 displays fourteen PHP instructions collected from vulnerable and nonvulnerable slices. e representation of the instructions into ISL is illustrated in Listing 3. It is possible to observe that some instructions may have more than one representation, depending if the extracted slice is vulnerable or not. For example, the instruction h position in Listing 3 appears as two series (the two lines immediately below of it) corresponding to the sanitization of an untainted and a tainted variable, respectively. In the listing, it is also visible the di erence between the var and var vv tokens. Listing 4 has the nal corpus that is produced a er applying the last two steps. Each sequence of observations is annotated with the state as explained above. e duplicated sequences are eliminated as several PHP instructions can result in the same sequence. For example, PHP instructions in lines 1 and 2 (Listing 2) become the same sequence (line 1 of Listing 4).
Configuring the HMM
e sequence model was mostly de ned in Section 6. e only missing piece of information are the parameters, i.e., the various probabilities to arrive to the start-states, to do the state transitions, and to perform the emissions of the observations. e probabilities are computed from the corpus by counting the number of occurrences of observations and/or states. e result is 3 matrices of probabilities with dimensions of (1 × s), (s × s) and (t × s), where s and t are the number of states and tokens of the model. e matrices are calculated as follows: Start-state probabilities: count how many sequences begin in each state. en, get the probability for each state by dividing these counts by the number of sequences of the corpus. is produces a matrix with the dimension (1 × 5).
Example 7.6. To obtain the start-state probability of the San state, we count how many sequences begin with the San state and divide by the size of the corpus. Transition probabilities: count how many times in the corpus a certain state i transits to a state k (including itself). e transition probability is obtained by dividing this count by the number of pairs of states that appear in the corpus that begin with the i state. e resulting matrix has a dimension of (5 × 5), keeping the various probabilities for all possible transitions between the ve states.
Example 7.7. e transition probability for the N-Taint state to the Taint state is the number of occurrences of this transition in the corpus divided by the number of pairs of states that begin in the N-Taint state.
Emission probabilities: count how many times a certain observation is emi ed by a particular state, i.e., count how many times a certain pair token,state appears in the corpus. en, calculate the emission probability by dividing this count by the total number of pairs token,state that occur for that speci c state. e resulting matrix -called global emission probabilities matrix -has a dimension of (22 × 5) in order to have a probability for the 22 tokens that could emi ed by each of the 5 states. Zero-probabilities should be avoided because the Viterbi algorithm uses multiplication to calculate the probability of moving to the next state, and therefore one needs to ensure that this multiplication is never zero. e add-one smoothing technique [13] can address this issue and help to compute the values of the parameters. is technique simply adds a unit to all counts, making zero-counts equal to one and the associated probability di erent from zero.
Detecting Vulnerabilities
Given the source code of an application, the collector gathers the slices that should be examined, and then every slice is inspected separately. To commence, the instructions of the slice are translated to ISL. is means that the slice becomes a list of sequences of observations, each one corresponding to a PHP instruction. e discovery of aws is accomplished by processing the sequences in the order of appearance, starting with the rst and concluding with the last. e HMM model is applied to each sequence of observations to nd out the associated states. We resort to an extension of the Viterbi algorithm to perform this task. e algorithm employs dynamic programming to compute the most likely succession of states that explain a sequence of observations. As the algorithm nishes with a sequence, a nal state comes out, either as Taint or N-Taint. is information is then propagated to the next sequence. e process is repeated for all sequences, and the nal state of the last sequence de nes the outcome for the slice -either as vulnerable (if it is tainted) or non-vulnerable (if it is untainted).
For the classi cation to be carried out e ectively, it is necessary to spread faithfully the taintedness among the sequences under analysis, which means keeping information about the variables that are tainted. For this purpose, we use three artifacts that are updated as the execution evolves:
• Tainted List (TL): as sequences are processed, it keeps the identi ers of the variables that are perceived as tainted; • Conditional Tainted List (CTL): contains the inputs (token input) and tainted variables (belong to TL) that have been validated (e.g., by tokens typechk num and contentchk); • Sanitized List (SL): has essentially a similar aim as CTL, except that it maintains the variables that are sanitized or modi ed (e.g., with functions that manipulate strings).
Example 7.9. Fig. 2 has the PHP code for the two slices composed of lines {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 3, 5, 6} respectively. A er processing the rst slice, TL = {u, a} and CTL = {u, a} as variable u is the parameter of the contentchk token and variable a is the parameter of the typechk int token. e nal state is N-Taint because variable u is included in CTL. In the other slice, TL = {u, a} and CTL = { } since there is no validation and the nal state is Taint.
In our implementation, the Viterbi algorithm was extended to explore the information kept in the variable map and in these artifacts (further details in Section 8.1.1). Handling a sequence of observations becomes a three step procedure: (1) a preprocessing step is carried out -beforeVit;
(2) then, the decoding step of the Viterbi algorithm is applied -decodeVit; (3) and lastly, a postprocessing step is executed -afterVit. ey work as follows: beforeVit: the variable map is visited to get the name of the variable associated to each var observation. e TL and SL are checked to determine if they hold that name. In case the sequence starts with the token cond, the list CTL is also accessed. If a variable only belongs to TL, then the var observation is modi ed to var vv, thus capturing the e ect of the variable being tainted. Finally, an emission probability sub-matrix for the observations of the sequence is also retrieved from the global emission probabilities matrix; decodeVit: for each observation, the Viterbi algorithm calculates the probability of each state to emit it, considering the probabilities of emission, of transition, and of the states already discovered. e multiplication of these three probabilities results in a probability called score of state. e state that is assigned to an observation is the one that has the highest score. e process is repeated for all observations and the state of the last observation is the one that classi es the sequence as Taint or N-Taint. In more detail, the three probabilities are obtained as follows: emission come from the sub-matrix of emission probabilities, regarding the observations that will be processed; transition are from the matrix of transition probabilities; previous state is determined by picking up the highest score computed for the previous observation. is last probability brings to the calculation the order in which the observations appear in the sequence and the knowledge already discovered about the previous observations. However, since this knowledge does not exist for the rst observation of the sequence, in this case the start-state probabilities are used; afterVit: if the sequence is an assignment (i.e., the last observation of the sequence is a var token and the entry in the variable map starts with 1), then the corresponding variable name is obtained from variable map. Next, the TL is updated: (i) inserting the variable name if the nal state is Taint; or (ii) removing it if the state is N-Taint and the variable is in TL; in the presence of a sanitization sequence, the variable name is also added to SL. In case the sequence is an if condition (i.e., the rst and last observations are a cond token), then the variable map is searched for each var and var vv observation. Next, the TL is searched to discover if it includes the name, and in that situation, the CTL is updated by inserting that name. e end result of these actions is that one gets the ability to keep the relevant knowledge about the propagation of inputs through the slice, and thus determine how they can in uence the sensitive sinks.
Example 7.10. Fig. 1(a) and (b) shows an example of the detection of a bug. It comprises from le to right: the PHP code, the representation in ISL, the variable map, and the TL a er observations are classi ed. In line 1, the Viterbi algorithm is applied and as result the var observation is tainted because by default an input observation is so; the model classi es it correctly and variable u is inserted in TL. In line 2, the rst var observation is updated to var vv because it corresponds to variable u that belongs to TL, and then the Viterbi algorithm is applied; the var vv var sequence is classi ed by the model and the nal state is Taint; therefore, variable q is inserted in TL. e process is repeated for the next line, allowing the discovery of the aw. Fig. 1(c) presents the decoding of the slice while the processing progresses. Here, it is possible to see the places where var is replaced by var vv, with the relevant variable name as su x. In addition, the states of each observation are also added. By following the generated states, one can understand the e ects of the code execution (without actually running it), which variables are tainted, and why the code is vulnerable. e state of the last observation indicates the nal classi cation -a vulnerability.
IMPLEMENTATION AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT
Our approach is implemented in the DEKANT tool. A corpus was also created to train the model. is corpus can be extended in the future with additional annotated sequences, allowing the tool to evolve its knowledge and detection capabilities.
Implementation of DEKANT
DEKANT is programmed in Java and its architecture is divided in four major modules, which are explained below in more detail: Knowledge extractor: operates separately from the other modules and is executed when the corpus is built or later modi ed. It runs in three steps: (i) the sequences composed of series of annotated tokens are loaded from a plain text le. Each sequence is separated in pairs token,state and the elements of each pair are inserted in the matrices called observations and states. Since sequences normally have di erent numbers of pairs, it becomes necessary to normalize the length of all sequences in the corpus. is is accomplished by rst determining the length of the largest sequence, and then by padding shorter sequences with the miss token together with the state of the last observation (i.e., with pairs miss,Taint or miss,N-Taint ) to ensure that all sequences have the same length; (ii) then, the various probabilities of the model are computed as explained in the previous section; (iii) lastly, all relevant information about the model is saved in a plain text le to be loaded by the vulnerability detector module. Slice collector: uses a lexer and a parser to process PHP code (based on ANTLR 2 ). It searches the application les for places where inputs arrive from the user and then tracks the data ows until either a security-critical instruction is reached or the program exits. Slices that have both an entry point and a sensitive sink are passed to the translator (and the others are discarded). e information about which entry points and sensitive sinks should be considered is provided in a con guration le.
Slice translator: e module reads con guration les describing the classes of tokens, e.g., containing the PHP functions that are represented by tokens. Some of them are transversal to any class of vulnerability, whereas others are speci c to a particular bug. For example, the input le contains $ GET and $ POST global arrays and the ss xss le has the security-sensitive functions associated with XSS (e.g., echo). e module rst parses the slice and next veri es which tokens should be assigned to each PHP instruction, following the ISL grammar rules. Simultaneously, it also generates the variable map. Vulnerability detector: works in three steps to nd the bugs. (i) the probabilities are loaded from a le and the model is setup internally; (ii) the slice translated into the intermediate language is processed using the modi ed Viterbi algorithm. Sometimes, it occurs that a sequence has more observations than the largest sequence that was seen in the corpus. When this happens, it is necessary to divide the sequence in sub-sequences with at most the maximum corpus sequence length. en, each one is classi ed separately, but the algorithm is careful to ensure that the initial probability of the following sub-sequence is equal to the probability resulting from the previous sub-sequence; (iii) lastly, the various probabilities are estimated for a sequence of observations to be explained by particular sequences of states, and the most probable is chosen. An alert message is issued if a vulnerability is found.
Extensions to the Viterbi algorithm.
We extended the Viterbi algorithm with the two procedures of Section 7.4 (beforeVit and afterVit) to track the propagation of inputs while processing a slice and to explore the data structures that keep relevant knowledge about variables (e.g., the three artifacts TL, CTL and SL).
Listing 5 presents the beforeVit preprocessing procedure that is run before the Viterbi algorithm. beforeVit does a few tests to manipulate some ags and change the data structures. For each observation (obs) in the sequence (inst slice isl) there are checks to nd out: (i) the presence of sanitization (sanit f) or a cond tokens. For the la er case, it is veri ed the obs position in the sequence to discover if the instruction is an if statement, an instruction inside of a conditional statement, or an else statement (lines 19 to 30); (ii) an if statement is searched for validation functions and if their parameters are a variable or an input (i.e., var or input). In such case, var or input are inserted in CTL (lines 32 to 48); (iii) an instruction inside an if statement is checked if the var and input tokens belong to CTL and/or SL. VM (variable map) is accessed to get the name of variable associated to var token. If the token input belongs to the SL or CTL lists, it is replaced by the var token because it has to loose its taintedness (we recall that by default this token is tainted and the var token is untainted, so this replacement is required) (lines 50 to 61); (iv) in presence of another instruction and if the observation is a var token, i.e., the inst slice isl is out of the validation scope, the name of variable is taken from VM and checked if it belongs to TL but not in SL. In such a case, the variable is tainted, and the observation is replaced by the var vv token (lines 63 to 71). For all four veri cations, the emission probability of the observation in analysis is retrieved from the global emission probabilities matrix (GEP), then it is inserted in the emission probabilities matrix (EP) of the inst slice isl (line 72).
A erwards, the traditional Viterbi algorithm is executed (decodeVit step as explained in Section 7.4) and then the post-processing afterVit procedure runs. 9 ** val -variable for controlling validation functions 10 ** san -variable for controlling sanitization functions 11 ** EP -emission probability matrix of instruction_slice_isl 12 ** GEP -global emission probabilities matrix 13 ** obs_ep -emission probability of the obs in analysis 14 Listing 6 shows afterVit. It takes as inputs the nal state of the inst slice isl (state) and the assignment value (value) of the instruction stored in VM (lines [11] [12] , and then makes the following checks: (i) if the instruction is an assignment, then the last observation of the sequence is a variable (var or var vv token), so the name of the variable (var name) is taken from VM (lines [14] [15] . (ii) if the instruction is classi ed as Taint, then the assignment variable is tainted, so the var name is put in TL. If this var name already belongs to SL, it is removed from this list (lines [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . (iii) if the instruction is classi ed as N-Taint, then the assignment variable is untainted, and therefore it can be removed from TL. Additionally, it is veri ed if the instruction is a result of a sanitization operation, and in such case the name is inserted in SL (lines 22-26). 
Corpus Construction and Assessment
e model needs to classify correctly the sequences of observations or, in our case, needs to detect vulnerabilities without mistakes. Since the model is con gured with the corpus, its quality depends strongly on incorporating valid and enough information in the corpus. erefore, to build the corpus, we resorted to a method inspired in Jurafsky and Martin [13] . e method operates iteratively in three phases to gradually assess and improve the resulting model. e evaluation phase veri es if the model outputs correctly a sequence of observations O for a given sequence of states S. e decoding phase determines if the model outputs a S that explains correctly a given O.
is phase corresponds to the objective of our approach. e last phase, re-learning, veri es if the model needs adjustments to its parameters in order to maximize the results of the previous phases. It consists of enhancing the model by adding more sequences to the corpus and running another cycle of the method.
A er applying the method, the resulting corpus had 510 slices, where 414 are vulnerable and 96 are non-vulnerable. ese slices were extracted from various open source PHP applications 3 and had aws from the twelve classes presented in Section 3. e probability matrices that were computed based on this corpus are shown in Fig. 6 . 
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To perform a preliminary assessment the model, we applied a 10-fold cross validation [8] . is form of validation involves dividing the training data (the corpus of 510 slices) in ten folds. en, the model is trained with a sub-corpus of nine of the folds and tested with the tenth fold. is process is repeated ten times to evaluate every fold with a model trained with the rest. e metrics that are used in the evaluation are: Accuracy (acc) measures the ratio of well-classi ed slices (as vulnerable and non-vulnerable) over the total number of slices (N ), whereas precision (pr) assesses the fraction of classi ed bugs that are really vulnerabilities. e objective is high accuracy and precision or, similarly, to minimize the false positive rate (fpr) which is the rate of generating false alarms for slices that are correct, and to minimize the false negative rate (fnr) which is the rate of missing certain vulnerable slices. Given that tp and tn are the well-classi ed instances as vulnerable and non-vulnerable, while fp is the false alarms and fn is the missing alarms, the metrics are computed with: acc = (tp + tn)/N ; pr = tp/(tp + f p); f pr = f p/(f p + tn); and f nr = f n/(f n + tp). Table 3 presents a confusion matrix for the alerts produced by DEKANT in the rst two phases of the method. For example, the rst row says that DEKANT issued 419 alerts in the evaluation phase but that 14 of them were mistakes (columns 2 and 3). In the evaluation phase, the precision and accuracy are very high, around 0.97 and 0.95, and the rates are small (fpr is 0.15 and fnr is 0.02). In the decoding phase, the results are even more positive, with a precision and accuracy approximately of 0.96 and rates of 0.17 and 0.005 (almost null fnr rate). Since there is a trade-o between the two rates, it is interesting to notice that there is a very low fnr that leads to a few FPs (wrong alerts). is is advantageous because the alternative would mean missing vulnerabilities. So, these results provide promising evidence of the excellent performance of DEKANT, something that we will be check more thoroughly in the next section.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our experimental evaluation addresses the following questions about DEKANT: (1) Is the tool able to discover novel vulnerabilities? (Section 9.1); (2) Can it classify correctly various classes of vulnerabilities? (Section 9.1); (3) Is DEKANT more accurate and precise than tools that search for vulnerabilities in plugins (Section 9.2); tools that do data mining using standard classi ers (Section 9.3); and, tools that do taint analysis (Section 9.4)?
9.1 Open Source So ware Evaluation is section assesses the ability of DEKANT to classify di erent vulnerabilities by analyzing 23 WordPress plugins [41] and 23 packages of real web applications. All of these are wri en in the PHP language. e plugins are used to determine if the tool is useful for the discovery of new (zero-day) vulnerabilities. e applications serve as a ground truth for the evaluation, since they have known vulnerabilities -13 of the packages contain bugs found by [18] and the other 10 packages have aws disclosed by various researchers in the past. In every test, DEKANT resorted to the corpus explained in the previous section (however, none of the programs utilized in the evaluation was employed to build the corpus). All outputs of the tool were con rmed by us manually to pinpoint valid detections and mistakes.
Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Plugins.
WordPress is the most adopted Content Management System (CMS) worldwide, and therefore its plugins are interesting targets for our study. We selected a diverse set of plugins based on two criteria, the development team and the number of downloads. For the former, we chose 13 plugins built by companies and the other 10 by individual developers. For the second, we picked 10 with less than 20,000 downloads and the other 13 with more than 20,000 downloads. Note that plugins with less downloads were not always those created by individual developers. e plugins were chosen to have also diverse characteristics with regard to the number of les and lines of code (LoC). Although plugins are o en believed to be small, in a few cases they had more than 200 les and 100,000 LoC (see Table 7 ). WordPress o ers a set of functions to sanitize and validate the data types, to read entry points, and to handle SQL commands ($wpdb class), which are invoked by some of the plugins. erefore, we con gured DEKANT with information about these functions, mapping them to the ISL tokens. Recall that ISL abstracts the PHP instructions, enabling certain behaviors to be captured like sanitization.
DEKANT extracts 345 slices from the plugins that begin at an entry point and end at a sensitive sink. Next, it translates them into ISL and executes the detection procedure. In total 220 slices are reported as potentially being vulnerable, but 5 of them are actually invalid alarms (i.e., false positives (FP)). ere are 62 new vulnerabilities that no one had previously found, and 153 bugs that had already been published by other researchers (Table 4 ). e remaining slices, a group of 125, are correctly perceived as not vulnerable. e aws belong to six classes of vulnerability, ranging from SQLI to CS (columns [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
e zero-day vulnerabilities appear in 21 plugins: 11 developed by companies and 10 by individual programmers; and 11 having more than 20,000 downloads. e most vulnerable plugin is the one that has more les, while the plugins appearing in the next places are smaller, and the largest plugin in terms of LoC has less than 4 identi ed bugs. ese results reveal that, independently of the development teams, number of downloads, les, and LoC, several of the WordPress plugins used in the wild are insecure.
e new aws were reported to the developers, and in some cases they have already been acknowledged and xed, resulting in the release of updated versions of the plugins 4 . Overall, these experiments are encouraging because the approach demonstrated the potential for the discovery of many classes of vulnerabilities in several open-source plugins, some of them with considerable user bases.
Real Web Applications.
To determine if DEKANT is e ective at classifying the vulnerabilities belonging to the twelve classes under study, we run the tool with 23 well known vulnerable open source so ware packages divided into two sets. e rst set is composed of 13 applications with more than 4,000 les and almost 1 million LoC (Table 5) . A few of the packages are large, such as Play sms and Clip Bucket, with approximately 250 and 150 thousand LoC. ere are 727 slices evaluated in this experiment, which were classi ed manually to enable the validation of the outcomes of DEKANT. Table 5 , in columns 6-9, displays the results of this e ort, where Vul stands for vulnerable slices, San for sanitized, and VC for validated and/or changed.
DEKANT takes a short time to perform the analysis, in the order of tens of seconds (column 5). Columns 10-13 show that the tool correctly classi es 503 slices as being vulnerable (Vul), 14 slices are wrongly labeled as having bugs (FPs) and 4 have errors that remain undetected (i.e., false negatives (FN)). Columns 14-21 present how the 503 slices are sorted out into the twelve classes of vulnerabilities (column Files aggregates three classes). Misclassi cation (FPs and FNs) is mainly explained by the presence of validation and string modi cation functions with context-sensitive states. In particular, most FPs belong to the class PHPCI, a type of vulnerability related to the execution of preg match and preg replace functions (the remaining were in classes HI and XSS).
e FNs are also associated with PHPCI bugs. Summing-up, the results are reassuring as DEKANT correctly classi es every vulnerability that was described in [18] , but actually with less FP. e accuracy and precision are very high, around 0.97, and the FP rate is 0.06 and the FN rate is 0.01.
For the second set, we run DEKANT with ten applications with aws previously registered in the CVE [5] and NVD [21] databases ( Table 6 ). In total more than 4,200 les and 1.5 million LoC are analyzed. e largest packages are epesi and phpMyAdmin, with approximately 750 and 250 thousand LoC. Similarly to the rst set of applications, we extracted 310 slices, which were then checked manually.
DEKANT classi es 223 slices as having bugs but 12 alarms are invalid (columns 5-6). e vulnerabilities pertain to six classes, where the most common are SQLI and XSS (columns 7-10, with Files aggregating DT, RFI and LFI). e FPs occur in the XSS and PHPCI classes due to equivalent reasons as above. e remaining 87 slices are correctly set as not-vulnerable (not shown in the table). Consequently, we could not nd missed bugs (i.e., FN is zero).
Overall, DEKANT had accuracy and precision of 0.96 and 0.95, and a FP rate of 0.12 (and no FNs). ese results are very similar to the ones of the rst set, demonstrating that the tool is capable of detecting vulnerabilities and of classifying them correctly independently of their classes. [20] , and compares them to DEKANT. e two tools implement taint analysis in a diverse manner, but still with the aim of tracking data that ows from the entry points to the sensitive sinks. WAPe is an extension of WAP, and since it is highly con gurable, we could set it up with the same knowledge about WordPress functions as DEKANT. phpSAFE only looks for SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins. erefore, to make the comparison among tools fair, we decided to consider only these two classes in the evaluation, and accounted the slices with other bugs as not vulnerable. e experiments are based on the 23 plugins previously presented, which have a total of 349 slices (the 345 slices of Section 9.1.1 plus 4 extra slices that were extracted by the other two tools). e results are summarized in Table 7 .
DEKANT evaluates 345 slices (columns 5-8) and outputs 177 of them as potentially vulnerable to SQLi and XSS. Out of this group, 172 of them have real bugs and 5 are FPs. e remaining 168 slices are correctly classi ed as not vulnerable. While processing the results, we observed that: (i) there are four vulnerabilities that only DEKANT is able to nd; (ii) a few slices with bugs are not collected by DEKANT, which inevitably leads to FNs. is last observation con rms the fundamental role of the slice extractor in these tools, as it gets the paths in code that end up being inspected.
WAPe discovers 122 bugs but misses 54 (columns 9 to 13). e tool includes a false positive predictor, whose aim is to look at the results of taint analysis and exclude bug reports that are potentially invalid -these are called false positives predicted (FPP). A er analysis, three cases are deemed FPP, leaving only two FPs. In the case of DEKANT, these ve slices are placed in the non-vulnerable set. WAPe and DEKANT extract 126 slices in common, but there is one slice that is only obtained by the former tool. is slice is correctly classi ed as vulnerable by WAPe (and causes a FN in the other tools). phpSAFE could only process 17 plugins (out of 23) and three of them partially (columns 14 to 18). For this reason, only 234 slices out of 349 are examined. Within the group of analyzed slices, there are 87 vulnerabilities that are found and 33 that are missed. However, phpSAFE nds three errors that no other tool is able to discover. e 84 FPs are caused by the inclusion of sanitization and input change functions in the slices, such as substr and preg replace from PHP and esc a r and prepare from WordPress (the last one protects a SQL statement from SQLI a acks, providing similar functionality as prepared statements). phpSAFE scans 102 extra slices (aside from the 349 group), which are labeled as possible false positives (PFP) in our evaluation. ese cases are associated with parts of the code where the results of SQL queries are used in some sink (e.g., to embed database content in a web page returned to a browser). e tool considers any of these results as malicious input, independently of the type of query (e.g., an INSERT or UPDATE SQL command) and the sanitization of query' parameters. In addition, the tool does not seem to correlate these queries with the ones that insert data in the database, and therefore it is di cult to conclude that these slices have any real problem. erefore, due to this ambiguity, we keep these slices separate from the rest. Table 8 has the metrics results for the three tools (columns 2-4). DEKANT is superior with the highest combined accuracy and precision and low FP and FN rates. WAPe is second, being the tool with the lowest FP rate and the second highest FN rate. phpSAFE has the worst performance, with signi cantly lower accuracy and precision. Notice that the 102 PFPs of phpSAFE are disregarded from the calculations. 
Comparison with Data Mining Tools
A few other tools have implemented data mining mechanisms for tasks related with bug discovery, namely WAPe and PhpMinerII [28, 29] . WAPe and PhpMinerII classify slices by resorting to data mining with standard classi ers, which do not consider order. WAPe obtains the slices with taint analysis and then predicts if they are FPs or TPs with the classi ers, with the aim of reducing the alerts that are generated by mistake. PhpMinerII uses data mining to nd out if slices hold a ributes that make them look vulnerable, without speci c concerns about false positives. is tool handles only SQLI and re ected XSS vulnerabilities. Since PhpMinerII is not con gurable with information about WordPress, and consequently it would perform much worse with plugins, we opted to experiment with the rst set of 13 application packages. Similarly, the same limitation applies to the vulnerability detection tools that will be studied in the next section, and so we will focus on these applications for the rest of the evaluations.
We observed that the various tools (from this and next section) survey di erent groups of slices because of their speci c implementation of the slice extractor. erefore, we decided to create a superset with all slices that could be captured based on the outputs of the tools, which contains 2609 slices. is set was then manually examined to determine which slices are vulnerable, and it serves as a ground truth. Overall there are 582 slices with vulnerabilities (117 SQLI, 360 XSS, and 105 others) and 2027 slices without problems. is second group was divided in a few subsets, namely, slices with sanitized input, slices with validated or modi ed input, and slices without external sources (i.e., without entry points) but with a sensitive sink. is last group was provided by PhpMinerII and we designate it as the no-source subset. Table 9 . e vulnerabilities are distributed by classes SQLI, XSS and others, to facilitate the assessment of alternative tools that only address speci c bugs (like PhpMinerII). Columns 2 to 6 are about DEKANT, displaying a total of 503 identi ed bugs. Notice that there are 75 more FNs than in Table 5 because now we are covering a larger number of slices, some of which are not extracted by DEKANT. e next six columns display WAPe's results. WAPe reports less vulnerabilities and a few more FPs and FNs.
All Vulnerability Classes. A summary of the experimental results is included in
With regard to false positives, DEKANT judges correctly as not vulnerable the 71 validated and/or changed slices (i.e., column VC in Table 5 ) but WAPe just predicts 48 of them as FPP. Even though WAPe handles a considerable number of symptoms to reduce mistakes, there is a lack of a ribute relation veri cation that induces erroneous decisions -the tool only checks if a ributes exist in a slice but does not have a way to relate them. e di erence in false negatives between the tools is also explained by the same reason, plus the importance of considering the order of the code elements in the slice. In particular, a misclassi cation can occur when there is a concatenation of tainted with untainted variables (i.e., which were validated or modi ed); this causes the data mining classi er to nd symptoms related with validation and outputs the slices as FPs. DEKANT implements a sequence model that takes into account how the code elements appear in the slice, prevailing in these situations. Table 10 sums up de evaluation, combining the confusion matrix and metrics. e results are encouraging with DEKANT performing be er than WAPe, namely because it shows superior FP and FN rates. 9.3.2 Just SQLI and XSS. is subsection only considers SQLI and re ected XSS for a fair comparison with PhpMinerII. PhpMinerII does not come trained when downloaded, and so we had to build a dataset for that purpose. e training dataset was constructed by recreating the procedure explained in [28, 29] , where the WEKA package implemented the data mining tasks [40] . e same classi ers were evaluated to select the best. Overall, the C4.5/J48 classi er was chosen, with an accuracy and precision close to 0.92. Table 9 has the results for PhpMinerII. e tool obtains 1052 slices, where 219 are reported as vulnerable and 833 as not-vulnerable. Manually, we inspected these slices and found out that only 604 were correctly labeled, 124 as vulnerable and 480 as not-vulnerable. Consequently, the tool generates 95 FP and 353 FN. is notable misclassi cation is explained by various factors, such as missing validations and string modi cations of inputs, and not taking into account the order of code elements. In addition, some of the slides belong to the no-source subset and they lead necessarily to invalid alarms (as there is no entry point to be maliciously exploited).
DEKANT outputs 412 vulnerabilities and 8 incorrect reports (out of the 14 shown in table). It also misses 65 slices with bugs (out of the 79 shown in table). WAPe classi es 405 vulnerabilities, but with 16 FPs (of the 23 presented in table) and 72 FNs (out of the 88). Only 82 of the 124 identi ed bugs by PhpMinerII are also agged as being vulnerable by DEKANT and WAPe. is means that the 42 remaining vulnerable slices justify the increase of FN in the two tools. Table 8 displays the calculated metrics when only SQLI and XSS are contemplated. DEKANT and WAPe surpass PhpMinerII, exhibiting higher quality values for all metrics. Both DEKANT and WAPe have an excellent accuracy and precision, but the former is superior with 0.97 and 0.98 on the metrics. In addition, DEKANT has be er rates for false positives and false negatives.
Comparison with Taint Analysis Tools
ere have been tools proposed in the past that perform taint analysis to locate vulnerabilities, and two notable examples are RIPS [6] and Pixy [12] . ey track data arriving at the entry points to determine if it reaches a sensitive sink, taking sanitization operations in consideration. RIPS detects the same classes of vulnerabilities as DEKANT, but Pixy only looks for SQLI and re ected XSS. Our evaluation compares the three tools while processing the same applications of the previous section (i.e., the dataset with 2609 slices), with results being displayed in Table 9 . 9.4.1 All Vulnerability Classes. e RIPS tool only outputs information about slices that are regarded as vulnerable. erefore, when no result appears for a particular slice, this could occur because the slice was considered valid or due to the inability to extract the slice. Since we are unable to separate the two situations, this brings some level of uncertainty to the analysis.
RIPS generates alerts for a total of 440 slices in 11 applications (of the 13). Out of this group, 208 correspond to slices with real bugs and the remaining 232 to false alerts.
ese FPs occur essentially in slices with functions that change the data received at the entry points (such as, substr and preg replace) or in slices with validation functions. is demonstrates the importance of the identi cation of false positive symptoms and of evaluating the slices taking into consideration the order of code elements (like DEKANT does). RIPS does not catch 374 vulnerabilities from the ground truth. We speculate that the reason for this high number of FNs is probably related to the extractor being unable to gather many slices. Table 10 has the confusion matrix and the metrics. RIPS is outperformed by both DEKANT and WAPe in the dataset with all classes of aws. Its accuracy and precision are 0.77 and 0.47, which are not as high as the other tools. 9.4.2 Just SQLI and XSS. Pixy only searches for SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities. erefore, our evaluation just covers these two classes (meaning that the 105 slices with other vulnerabilities are treated as being true negatives).
Pixy results are displayed in the last four columns of Table 9 . e tool raises 1332 alerts, but the majority of them are mistakes 5 . Only 301 reported vulnerabilities are real (12 SQLI and 289 XSS). ere are 176 undetected bugs. Curiously, Pixy has around half the FNs of RIPS, and for some applications it is the tool that detects more XSS vulnerabilities (e.g., the Minutes application) but at the cost of a high FP rate. Section 9.3.2 presents the details about the DEKANT evaluation for SQLI and XSS bugs. In what concerns RIPS, the tool nds 145 buggy slices but misses 328 (out of the 374 in the table). It also wrongly reports 192 slices as being vulnerable (of the 232 in the table). Table 8 presents the metrics for these tools. e results corroborate the promising detection capabilities of DEKANT, as the tool has the best accuracy and precision and the lowest FP and FN rates. RIPS is second, but with an accuracy and precision reasonably below. For our dataset, the weakest values are obtained by Pixy, with a small precision due to the many FP.
CONCLUSION
e paper explores a new approach to detect web application vulnerabilities inspired in NLP in which static analysis tools learn to detect vulnerabilities automatically using machine learning. Whereas in classical static analysis tools it is necessary to code knowledge about how each vulnerability is detected, our approach obtains knowledge about vulnerabilities automatically. e approach uses a sequence model (HMM) that, rst, learns to characterize vulnerabilities from a corpus composed of sequences of observations annotated as vulnerable or not, then processes new sequences of observations based on this knowledge, taking into consideration the order in which the observations appear. e model can be used as a static analysis tool to discover vulnerabilities in source code and identify their location.
